There is strong empirical evidence that countries with lower per capita income tend to have smaller trade volumes even after controlling for aggregate income. Furthermore, poorer countries do not just trade less, but have a lower number of trading partners. In this paper, I construct and estimate a general equilibrium model of trade that captures both these features of the trade data. There are two novelties in the paper. First, I introduce an association between market access costs and countries' development levels, which can account for the e¤ect of per capita income on trade volumes and explain many zeros in bilateral trade ‡ows. Secondly, I develop an estimation procedure, which allows me to estimate both variable and …xed costs of trade. I …nd that given the estimated parameters, the model performs well in matching the data. In particular, the predicted trade elasticity with respect to income per capita is close to that in the data.
Introduction
There is strong empirical evidence suggesting that poorer countries (with lower per capita income) trade less even after controlling for aggregate income (see for example Hummels and Klenow (2002) ). In addition, poorer countries do not just export or import smaller volumes, but have a fewer number of trading partners. In 1995, for instance, 14% of all country pairs among the hundred largest countries in terms of GDP did not trade with each other in at least one direction. Furthermore, among those countries, the …fty poorest countries accounted for almost 75% of zero trade ‡ows in the sample. Hence, the country extensive margin (the number of trading partners) seems to be relevant in explaining the relationship between per capita income and trade volumes. However, even though a number of quantitative trade models capture the phenomenon that poor countries trade less, these models usually focus on explaining aggregate trade volumes and ignore the decomposition of trade volumes into trade margins.
In this paper, I construct and estimate a quantitative general equilibrium model of trade based on Melitz (2003) and Chaney (2008) that captures both the relationship between per capita income and trade volumes and the fact that poorer countries have fewer trading partners.
A core element of the model is an association between the costs of access to foreign markets and countries' development levels. This association is motivated by the evidence suggesting that …rms in poorer countries may face higher entry barriers to foreign markets (which in turn leads to a larger number of zeros in exports of less developed countries). Indeed, exporting …rms may be required to meet certain product standards, quality requirements, and technical regulations imposed by the destination country that are especially restrictive for developing and less developed countries. For instance, studies conducted by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development …nd that …rms in some developing countries were unable to meet environmental standards and regulations imposed by developed countries, which in turn resulted in considerable export losses (see Chen et al. (2006) ). 1 Poor infrastructure and bureaucracy 1 Quality requirements are another entry barrier for …rms from developing and less developed countries. The international management literature emphasizes that one of the key reasons for obtaining quality management certi…cation (ISO 9000) is the requirements of international customers. For instance, Potoski and Prakash (2009) argue that ISO certi…cation is a signal for the quality of a product, which is especially important for developing and less developed countries, as consumers often relate the quality of products to their countries of origin. Meanwhile, the process of certi…cation is costly. It includes both the costs of development and implementation of new production processes satisfying the standards and the costs of certi…cation itself (e.g. the costs of application and documentation review, registrar's visits, etc.). Mersha (1997) documents that achieving the quality management certi…cation is especially complicated in less developed countries (he considers the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa in particular).
also play a role of entry barriers for …rms in less developed countries. For example, because of a large number of long administrative procedures and poor logistics services, many …rms in less developed countries cannot meet the reliability requirements of foreign partners and, thereby, cannot enter foreign markets (see Nordas et al. (2006) ). 2 I consider an environment where each country is characterized by its population size and development level. Firms vary according to their productivity, which is de…ned as the product of a …rm-speci…c productivity and a country development level. Exporting …rms incur variable and …xed costs of trade. I assume that …xed costs of trade depend on the development level of the exporting country and, thereby, vary across countries. I show that if less developed countries have higher …xed costs of trade relative to other costs (the costs of entry into the industry and …xed costs of selling domestically), then, all else equal, they tend to have smaller trade volumes in equilibrium. 3 The assumed relationship between …xed costs of trade and countries' development levels also enables us to explain many export zeros in bilateral trade ‡ows. In the same manner as in Helpman et al. (2008) , the model is able to predict zero exports from i to j: this happens when there are no …rms in country i that are productive enough to …nd it pro…table to export to country j. I show that, other things equal, a country with higher …xed costs of trade (relative to other costs) has a higher export productivity cuto¤ for any export destination. Hence, if less developed countries have higher relative …xed costs of trade, then, other things equal, they tend to have a lower number of export destinations or, in other words, a lower number of trading partners.
To examine how well the model …ts the data, I estimate the key parameters of the model using the data for 1995 on bilateral trade ‡ows of the 100 largest countries in terms of total income. The estimation procedure involves minimizing the sum of squared di¤erences between the actual bilateral trade ‡ows and those generated by the model subject to the constraint that the number of zero bilateral trade ‡ows predicted by the model is the same as that in the data. 4 The novelty of this estimation procedure is that it allows us to estimate both variable 2 According to the Doing Business (2006) report, there is a signi…cant negative correlation between the number of documents required to be …lled out before exporting and per capita income of an exporting country: the poorer a country is, the greater the number of documents exporters of that country have to …ll out. 3 As usual in trade theory, relative terms are relevant. For instance, it might be the case that a country faces lower …xed costs of trade in absolute terms but trades less, as …xed costs of trade are higher relative to other costs. 4 Notice that mismatch is possible. The model can predict some zeros that are not actually observed in the data and vice versa.
and …xed costs of trade. If we drop the constraint on the zeros, variable and …xed costs of trade are not separately identi…able from the bilateral trade data. Furthermore, in contrast to the reduced form estimation (see for example Helpman et al. (2008) ), the procedure accounts for the general equilibrium features of the model and enables us to examine how well Melitz-type models perform in explaining the trade data.
After estimating the parameters of the model, I …nd that there is a strong correlation between …xed costs of trade predicted by the model and countries'development levels. Speci…cally, less developed countries incur higher …xed costs of trade and, therefore, tend to have smaller trade volumes and a lower number of trading partners. The model performs quite well in matching the data. For instance, in the data, doubling a country's per capita income (controlling for the aggregate income) on average leads to a 19% increase in trade on average, while the model predicts an increase in trade of 22%. 5 Given the estimated parameters, the model is able to explain 35% of export zeros in the data. In other words, 35% of the zeros predicted by the model are zeros that are actually observed in the data (the rest is mismatch). 6 As a comparison, the exact same model but without the assumed variation in …xed costs correctly predicts only 9% of zeros. Hence, the relationship between …xed costs of trade and countries' development levels matters and helps to explain 26% of export zeros in the data. The estimation strategy allows us to determine the magnitude of …xed costs of trade. Given the estimated parameters, the aggregate spendings on access to foreign markets constitute on average around half of total export pro…ts. This …nding is very similar to that in Eaton et al. (2008) who estimate the market access costs using the data on …rm-level trade. in all countries rises with the average percentage change equal to 17% and larger gains for smaller and poorer countries. In particular, the real income inequality (measured as the ratio of the average real income of the ten richest countries to that of the ten poorest countries) falls by
28%.
The present paper is not the only one to explore the relationship between country's trade costs and per capita income. Waugh (2009) and Kortum (2002) by allowing for nonhomothetic preferences and cross-sector di¤erences in production technologies. 9 The present paper provides another, possibly complimentary, explanation of why poorer countries trade less, which is not based on nonhomotheticity of preferences.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic concepts of the model and describes the equilibrium. Section 3 presents the main theoretical …ndings of the model and derives their implications for trade volumes. Section 4 estimates the model and explores its quantitative implications. Section 5 conducts counterfactual analysis. Section 6 examines the quantitative implications of alternative speci…cations of the model. Section 7 concludes.
Theory
I consider a variation of the Melitz model extended to a world with N asymmetric countries.
Each country is characterized by its population size and development level. The only factor of production is labor, which is inelastically supplied by agents endowed with one unit of labor each.
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive heterogenous …rms producing di¤erent 7 Since Waugh (2009) considers a perfectly competitive environment, there are no …xed costs of trade in his model. 8 By the variation in trade costs, I mean the relationship between trade costs and countries'development levels.
Speci…cally, we can assume that variable costs of trade also depend on the exporter development level (see Section 6 for details). 9 See also Flam and Helpman (1987) , Hunter (1991) , Markusen (1986) , Matsuyama (2000) , Mitra and Trindade (2005) , and Stokey (1991) .
varieties of a di¤erentiated good. Without loss of generality, I assume that agents own equal shares of all …rms. 10 Hence, consumers in country j have identical incomes (which can vary across countries) consisting of labor income w j and the share of …rms'pro…ts j .
Consumption
I assume that consumers have identical homothetic preferences that take the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) form. In particular, a representative consumer in country j maximizes
where j is the set of available varieties in country j, q j (!) is quantity consumed, p j (!) is the price of variety ! in country j, L j is the population size of country j, and > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between varieties. This maximization problem yields that
where
is the CES price index: i.e., P j Q j = (w j + j ) L j .
Production
Production in each country is represented by an average industry with free entry into the industry. To enter the industry in country i, ex-ante identical …rms have to make sunk investments f ei associated with the creation of a new variety. Once a …rm incurs the costs of entry, it obtains a draw of its …rm-speci…c productivity from a distribution G( ) with the support on
This distribution is common for all …rms in all countries. Ex post, …rms vary by their productivities, which are the product of a …rm-speci…c productivity and the country development level Z i . Hence, both population size L i and development level Z i could a¤ect equilibrium outcomes for country i.
The price of variety ! sold in country j, p j (!), is determined by the productivity of the …rm producing this variety, its country of origin, and the destination market. Therefore, hereafter 1 0 A more general assumption is that each agent owns a balanced portfolio of shares of all …rms. However, due to free entry, the total pro…ts of all …rms are equal to zero in equilibrium. This implies that the value of any balanced portfolio is equal to zero. Therefore, to simplify the notation, I assume that agents have equal shares of all …rms.
I omit the notation of ! and use p ij ( ) instead of p j (!). We de…ne ij ( ) as the variable pro…ts from exporting to country j of the …rm, which produces in country i with …rm-speci…c productivity . Then,
where p ij ( ) solves the following maximization problem:
Here ij stands for variable trade costs between country i and j, which take Samuelson's iceberg form. I set ii to unity and assume that the triangle inequality holds for any ij : i.e., ij ik kj for any i, j, and k. 11
The pricing rule maximizing (4) is as follows:
Consequently, the variable pro…ts ij ( ) are given by
where C = 1 1 1 .
To export from country i to country j, …rms have to pay …xed costs f ij representing the costs of serving market j. 12 The presence of …xed costs implies that not all …rms …nd it pro…table to export or sell at home. Firms with relatively low productivities exit because of negative potential pro…ts. In particular, …rms located in country i with < ij decide not to export to country j, where the cuto¤ ij is determined by
The last expression implies that the cuto¤ ij is given by
1 1 The triangle inequality guarantees that it is cheaper to deliver goods from country i directly to country j, rather than to use another country as an intermediary. 1 2 The …xed costs of selling at home are fii.
Higher ij means that fewer …rms based in country i …nd it pro…table to export to country j.
In particular, if ij > H , then no …rm exports from country i to country j resulting in zero exports from i to j.
We de…ne r ij ( ) as the revenues received from exporting to country j by a …rm with located in country i. Then,
As a result, the total value of exports from country i to country j, X ij , is given by
where M ei is the mass of entrants into the industry. 13 Since there are M ei dG( ) …rms with productivity in country i, the measure of available varieties in country j is equal to:
Market Access Costs and Costs of Entry
I assume that the …xed costs of serving a certain market are subdivided into two parts: costs directly associated with serving the market (for instance, the construction of facilities) and costs associated with access to the market (for instance, satisfying product standards and quality requirements of the destination country). Furthermore, I assume that domestic …rms pay only the former, while foreign …rms pay both. Hence, the functional form for the …xed costs of exporting is as follows:
where f d and f x are common for all countries. The parameter describes how the country development level Z i a¤ects the …xed costs of exporting. If is greater (less) than zero, then more developed countries use fewer (more) units of labor to access foreign markets.
1 3 Note that the mass of …rms based in country i and serving market j is equal to Mij = Mei (1 G( ij )). In this manner, the expression (9) can be rewritten as
;
is the distribution of …rm-speci…c productivities conditional on ij .
This way of representing …xed costs of trade is one of the key points in the paper. Melitz (2003) considers trade between symmetric countries, so …xed costs are the same for all countries. Chaney (2008) explores the Melitz framework with many asymmetric countries. However, he does not impose any particular relationship or structure on …xed costs of trade.
In the present paper, it is assumed that …xed costs of exporting depend only on exporter characteristics. Meanwhile, Arkolakis (2008) and Eaton et al. (2008) argue that the costs of access to foreign markets depend on the characteristics of the destination market as well. For instance, Arkolakis (2008) relates …xed costs of exporting to product advertising requiring labor services from both source and destination countries. In Section 6, I consider alternative speci…-cations of the model, which include the dependence of …xed costs on the importer development level.
Finally, I assume that the costs of entry into the industry are given by
where f e is common for all countries.
Equilibrium
Given the set of parameters
::N , the equilibrium in the model is de…ned by fp ij ( ), P i , M ei , ij , w i g i;j=1::N such that 1) fp ij ( )g i;j=1::N are determined by the …rm maximization problem (see (5)).
2) fP i g i=1::N satisfy the following equation:
, which is equivalent to
3) Expected pro…ts of a given …rm are equal to zero, meaning that
::N satisfy the zero pro…t condition (see (7)).
5) Trade is balanced, implying that
Note that the set fw i ; P i , M ei g i=1::N is su¢ cient to determine all other endogenous variables in the model such as p ij ( ), ij ( ), r ij ( ), and ij . This implies that to …nd the equilibrium in the model, we need to …nd the set fw i ; P i , M ei g i=1::N , which satis…es the following system of equations: 8 > > > > > > < > > > > > > :
where p ij ( ), ij ( ), r ij ( ), and ij are expressed in terms of fw i ; P i , M ei g i=1::N and the parameters of the model. Thus, we have the system of 3N equations with 3N unknowns, fw i ;
N . Consequently, taking w N as numeraire, we can solve the system and …nd the endogenous variables for any given set of the parameters.
Per Capita Income and Trade Volumes
In the equilibrium, the total income of country i is given by w i L i , where w i is a function of both Z i and L i (and the other parameters of the model). 14 It is straightforward to show that all else equal, more developed countries (with higher Z i ) tend to have higher total income. This in turn means that there is a positive correlation between per capita income w i and development level
In this section, I compare trade volumes of two countries with identical total incomes but di¤erent components, per capita income and population size, within a given equilibrium. This way of conducting comparative statics corresponds to a cross-country comparison in the data.
In particular, I consider such an equilibrium that there are two countries, 1 and 2; which are identical in every way except for Z i and L i . Furthermore, I assume that
, and w 1 L 1 = w 2 L 2 in the equilibrium. 15 In this way, I restrict countries 1 and 2 to have the same size of economy but di¤erent per capita incomes: country 1 is richer and smaller, while country 2 is poorer and larger.
To capture only the e¤ects of Z i and L i on trade volumes, I assume that the countries are geographically symmetric and have identical trading partners. Namely, I assume that 1j = 2j 1 4 Recall that free entry into the industry leads to zero total pro…ts: i.e., i = 0 for all i = 1::N . This means that the total income in country i equals to wiLi. 1 5 Note that since higher Zi implies higher wi, we can always …nd such values of Z1 and Z2 that w1L1 = w2L2 in the equilibrium.
and j1 = j2 for all j > 2. In addition, I assume that trade costs between country 1 and 2 are so high that the countries do not trade with each other in the equilibrium. For instance, we can think that country 1 is located at the North Pole, country 2 is located at the South Pole, while the rest of the world is located along the equator. Note that this approach of analyzing the e¤ects of Z i and L i is equivalent to a standard comparative statics exercise (where we compare equilibrium outcomes before and after a change in a parameter) applied to a small open economy.
I show that if is greater than zero, then the richer country has greater trade volumes in the equilibrium. The intuition behind this result goes as follows. As Z 1 > Z 2 , for all j > 2,
In words, it is relatively less expensive to export than to create a new variety in country 1. As a result, country 1 has lower mass of entrants into the industry but a higher number of exporting …rms relative to the mass of entrants. Furthermore, for all j > 2,
That is, country 1 has lower …xed costs of trade relative to …xed costs of selling domestically.
This implies that country 1 has a higher number of exporting …rms not only relative to the mass of entrants, but also relative to the number of …rms serving the domestic market. This in turn leads to greater trade volumes in country 1. 16 Notice that as usual in trade theory, relative terms matter. It might be the case that a country faces lower …xed costs of trade in absolute terms but trades less, as …xed costs of trade are higher relative to the other costs. While the intuition is straightforward, the proof is quite complex. This is due to the di¢ culty of obtaining analytical results in the presence of asymmetries in Melitz type models. To prove this claim, I make two assumptions.
Assumption 1:
is weakly increasing in , where g( ) is the density function associated with G( ).
This assumption has a natural interpretation. It implies that g( ) does not decrease too fast;
i.e., the probability of getting higher values of does not decrease too fast with . For instance, a truncated Pareto distribution or a power distribution satis…es this condition.
Assumption 2: Trade costs are so high that 1j 11 and 2j 22 for all j > 2.
This is a standard assumption in trade literature, saying that exporting …rms serve the home market as well. It is consistent with empirical evidence: only a small fraction of …rms export and those that export also sell domestically.
Proposition 1 If > 0 and Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, then country 1 has greater trade volumes in equilibrium.
Proof. See the proof in Appendix A.
Note that in general, we can assume that the costs of entry into the industry and selling at home also depend on the country development level. This would not change the main …ndings above (except the condition on ), as we need di¤erences in relative terms. In the paper, I do not introduce this dependence, as it is not identi…able from the trade data.
Estimation
To understand the contribution of the imposed association between the market access costs and the development levels in explaining the trade data, I estimate the key parameters of the model.
In the estimation procedure, I use data on total income, population, bilateral trade ‡ows, and cultural and geographical barriers between country pairs for 1995. I consider the sample of the hundred largest countries in terms of GDP, for which the data sets are complete. 17 These countries account for 91:6% of world trade in 1995. I assume that the other countries do not exist (these hundred countries constitute the entire world). Exports to non-existent countries are considered as domestic sales.
Data on total income and population are taken from the World Bank (2007) . Table 13 reports the list of the countries in the sample arranged by the size of GDP. use trade values reported by the importing country, as they tend to be more precise than those reported by the exporter. However, if an importer report is not available, I use the corresponding exporter report instead. There are 1399 export zeros in the sample, which constitutes 14% of the total number of bilateral trade ‡ows.
As potential trade barriers, I consider distance, the e¤ects of common border and language, and the impact of membership in free trade areas. 19 Hence, for each country pair we need data on whether these countries have a common language or share a common border plus data on distance between them. 20 I take these data sets from the Centre d'Etudes Prospectives 
Parametrization
To estimate the model, we need to parametrize the distribution of …rm-speci…c productivity draws G( ) and variable trade costs ij . In parametrizing G( ), I follow a number of studies using a truncated Pareto distribution to describe the distribution of …rm productivities. 21 In 1 8 An alternative source for data on trade ‡ows is the NBER-UN data set constructed by Feenstra et al. (2005) .
However, this data set includes only trade ‡ows in a certain category with values greater than $100.000 per year. When aggregating, this may potentially lead to underestimation of aggregate exports and imports and overestimation of the number of zero trade ‡ows. 1 9 Many other variables (for instance, religion or colonial origin) can be used as additional measures of trade barriers between countries. However, to reduce the number of parameters I need to estimate, I consider only language, border, distance, and membership in free trade areas. 2 0 By distance between two countries, I mean the distance between the main cities in the countries. Usually, the main city is the capital. However, in some cases, the capital is not populated enough to serve a role of the economic center of the country. In these cases, the most populated city represents the country. 2 1 See e.g. Helpman et al. (2008) or Johnson (2007) . particular, I assume that
where 1 H > L > 0 and k > 1. The last condition guarantees that in the case when
I assume the following functional form for variable trade costs:
where f 0 ; 1 ; 2 ; 3 ; 4 ; 5 g is the set of parameters describing variable costs of trade. D ij is the distance between countries i and j, B ij and LN G ij are dummy variables for common border and language, and N AF ij and EU ij are dummy variables for whether countries i and j are members of NAFTA or EU, respectively. For instance, if 2 is less (greater) than one, then sharing a common border reduces (increases) the costs of trade between countries.
Hence, the set of parameters of the model is given by
Note that a number of parameters in (17), namely ff e ; f d ; ; k; L ; H g, are not identi…able from the trade data (i.e., the …t of the data does not vary as you change them). Therefore, I …x these parameters at values consistent with other work.
In …xing , I follow the results in the previous studies estimating the elasticity of substitution. Bernard et al. (2003) argue that equal to 3:8 captures the export behavior of the U.S.
plants best. Broda and Weinstein (2006) estimate the elasticity of substitution for di¤erent aggregation levels. In period 1990-2001 for SITC-3 aggregation level, the estimates vary from 1:2 (thermionic, cold cathode, photocathode valves, etc.) to 22:1 (crude oil from petroleum or bituminous minerals) with the mean equal to 4. The number obtained in Bernard et al. (2003) is close to the mean of the estimates in Broda and Weinstein (2006) . Following their results, I set equal to 3:8.
The distribution of productivity draws in (15) is characterized by parameters L , H , and k.
I normalize L to unity. In many studies, to simplify analytical derivations H is set to in…nity. 22 However, setting H to in…nity implies that there always exist some relatively productive …rms …nding it pro…table to export to any country. This means that the model will not generate 2 2 See for example Chaney (2008) . 
Estimation Procedure
The rest of the parameters is given by = f 0 ; 1 ; 2 ; 3 ; 4 ; 5 ; f x ; g. To estimate these parameters, I use a restricted non-linear least squares procedure. For given and fZ i ; L i g i=1::N , we can solve the system of equations (12) and …nd the equilibrium values of fw i ,
The condition (28) implies that any changes in fij and fei keeping (notice that if we know , we can construct f ij g i;j=1::N using (16)). Let X ij (Z; L; ) denote the value of exports from country i to j generated by the model conditional on , fZ i ; L i g i=1::N , and the corresponding equilibrium values of fw i ,
In words, if we know the parameters of the model and the exogenous variables Z and L, we can solve for the equilibrium and construct the corresponding bilateral trade ‡ows.
To estimate , I solve the following minimization problem:
subject to
where X o ij is the value of exports from i to j observed in the data. The estimation procedure discussed above is based on the fact that we know the values of
N we can use the data on population size in the countries, 2 4 The estimation procedure implies that the model …ts just the number of zeros. However, it is possible that the model generates zeros that are not actually observed in the data and vice versa. Therefore, we can decompose (Z; L; ) into the sum of two terms:
In (20), T (Z; L; ) is the di¤erence between the number of correctly predicted zeros (zeros predicted by the model and observed in the data) and the number of "actual" zeros, while F (Z; L; ) is the mismatch (zeros that are predicted by the model but not observed in the data). Hence, the restriction (19) implies that equal weights are attached to T (Z; L; ) and F (Z; L; ). In Appendix C, I examine alternative restrictions in the minimization problem. In particular, I consider the following restriction:
where " 2 [0; 1] represents a certain weight attached to the mismatch. For instance, if " is equal to zero, then the mismatch is of no importance and, as a result, the model predicts all the zeros in the data plus some others. If " is equal to unity, then we only care about the mismatch. All zeros generated by the model match the zeros in the data. Notice that if " is equal to 0:5, then we obtain the restriction in (20). In the Appendix, I consider " equal to 0:25 and 0:75. I …nd that changes in " a¤ect the implications of the model regarding zeros only (see Appendix C for details).
fZ i g i=1::N are not observable. To resolve this problem, I use the data on per capita income levels to reconstruct fZ i g i=1::N . Speci…cally, from the equilibrium conditions (12) we have that w = w(Z; L; ), where w = fw i g i=1::N . This implies that we can express Z in terms of w, L, and the parameters . That is, we can invert the function w(Z; L; ) and obtain Z = Z(w; L; ). 25
In the model, w i is equal to per capita income in country i, which is observed in the data. Hence, using the data for fw i g i=1::N we can reconstruct fZ i g i=1::N . In this case, the minimization problem can be rewritten as follows:
Note that the structure of the equations in (12) is nonlinear. This implies that the function w(Z; L; ) is not necessarily one-to-one. For instance, several di¤erent values of Z may lead to the same value of w. However, no such examples occur in the numerical analysis I conduct in the paper.
Notice that in the model, L i can be interpreted not only as population size in country i, but also as the size of labor force in that country. In the paper, I use the data on population sizes to construct fL i g i=1::N , while I also estimate the model using the data on the size of labor force in the countries. I …nd that the results do not substantially di¤er from those obtained in the paper.
In Appendix D, as a robustness check I consider alternative estimation procedures such as non-linear least deviations and non-linear least squares applied to logarithms rather than levels.
I …nd that these estimation procedures yield similar predictions as the procedure used in the paper.
Results
As a measure of the explanatory power of the model, I use
The explanatory power is 100%, if we are able to …t perfectly all bilateral trade ‡ows: i.e.,
2 5 ZUSA is normalized to unity. ln GDP i 0:04
where T i is the actual trade volumes of country i and T i (^ ) is the volumes of trade generated by the model given the estimated values of the parameters (see Table 2 ). As we can see from (23), the model captures the e¤ect of per capita income on trade volumes (conditional on total income) quite well. The corresponding coe¢ cient is not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. Meanwhile, the estimates in (23) suggest that the model somewhat underestimates trade volumes of large population countries. Table 3 reports the elasticities of trade with respect to total and per capita incomes observed in the data and generated by the model (the …rst and second columns, respectively). In the data, doubling a country income per capita (keeping the total income unaltered) leads on average to an increase in trade volumes of 19% and doubling a country population size raises trade volumes by 85%. The model predicts a rise in trade volumes of 22% and 69%, respectively.
Recall that the restriction (22) in the estimation procedure implies that the number of zero bilateral trade ‡ows generated by the model is the same as that in the data. As it was discussed above, mismatch is possible. I …nd that the model explains 35% of the zeros in the data. That is, 35% of zeros generated by the model match the zeros observed in the data, while the rest is mismatch. The key point is that the model underestimates trade volumes of large population countries. As a result, it generates a number of "false" zeros among countries with large population and does not predict many zeros in the data among small population countries.
Notice that the estimated association between a country development level and …xed costs of trade helps to explain many zeros in the data. In the next subsection, I estimate a variation of The estimated values of the parameters also allow us to determine the magnitude of …xed costs of trade. For each country I construct the ratio of the aggregate …xed costs of exporting to the aggregate export pro…ts, which is given by
The ratios vary from 0:32 (for Iceland) to 0:64 (for India) with the mean equal to 0:45. That is, the total costs of access to foreign markets constitute on average around the half of the total export pro…ts. The similar result is obtained in Eaton et al. (2008) , who …nd that the share of …xed costs in the gross pro…ts is a little more than half. By regressing the log of F C Ri on the logs of GDP and GDP per capita, I …nd that richer countries have the lower share of …xed costs of exporting in the total export pro…ts, while countries with larger population have the higher share. Namely, ln GDP i 0:14
In the next subsection, I estimate the model when is equal to zero and compare the quantitative implications of that model with those obtained above.
Identical Market Access Costs: Comparison
If is equal to zero, then
implying identical …xed costs of trade (in terms of labor) across countries. Since I …x at zero, the set of parameters estimated is f 0 ; 1 ; 2 ; 3 ; 4 ; 5 ; f x g. 
Model ( Observations: 100 100 100 elasticities generated by the model with equal to zero. As it can be seen from the table, the model does slightly better in predicting trade volumes of large population countries. Doubling a country population size raises trade volumes by 76% compared to an increase of 85% in the data. However, the e¤ect of per capita income on trade volumes is signi…cantly lower than that in the data. Conditional on the total income, doubling a country income per capita leads on average to an increase in trade volumes of 4%, while the e¤ect observed in the data is 19%. 27
Finally, the percentage of correctly predicted zeros is 9%. This constitutes the mismatch of 91%, which is substantially greater than the mismatch obtained in the case when …xed costs of exporting depend on a country development level.
Eliminating Asymmetries in Trade Costs
In this section, I use the estimated model to explore how the elimination of asymmetries in …xed costs of trade a¤ects consumer welfare across countries. Speci…cally, I consider an experiment where falls from 0:67 (the estimated value of ) to zero and examine the corresponding changes in consumer welfare. Remember that setting to zero removes the relationship between market access costs and development levels and, therefore, leads to symmetric …xed costs of trade:
The other parameters including Z are …xed at the values obtained from the benchmark estimation procedure (see Table 2 ).
Consumer welfare in country i (denoted as W i ) is equal to the real wage in that country.
Namely, for i = 1::N
Hence, given the parameters of the model, we can solve (12) for fw i ; P i ; M ei g i=1::N and then using (25), …nd the equilibrium value of consumer welfare in country i. Let us denote
as the percentage change in welfare in country i given the changes in the parameters of the model. 
As it can be seen, doubling a country population size on average reduces the welfare gains by 3%, while doubling a country per capita income (controlling for the total income of that country) reduces the gains by 5%. The former e¤ect is explained by the fact that setting to zero enhances trade in all countries. Since countries with larger population tend to have a lower trade to GDP ratio, those countries gain less compared to small population countries. The latter e¤ect is based on the feature of the model that …xed costs of trade depend on country development level: i.e., …rms in less developed countries face higher market access costs. Since …xing at zero eliminates this relationship, the changes in welfare are more substantial for less developed countries. I also …nd that removing asymmetries in …xed costs of trade dramatically reduces the number of zero bilateral trade ‡ows. In the new equilibrium (after setting to zero), there are only 4 export zeros in comparison with 1399 zeros when is equal to 0:67.
The …ndings above suggest that eliminating asymmetries in …xed costs of trade not only raises consumer welfare, but also reduces welfare inequality across countries (as poor countries gain relatively more). In particular, as a measure of the welfare inequality in the model, I
consider the ratio of the average income of the ten richest (in real terms) countries to that of the ten poorest countries. I …nd that setting to zero reduces the measured welfare inequality by 28%.
Alternative Speci…cations
In this section, I consider two alternative speci…cations of the model. First, I assume that …xed costs of trade depend on both exporter's and importer's development levels. Second, I examine the case when variable costs of trade depend on exporter's development level, while …xed costs of trade are identical across countries.
In the paper, …xed costs of trade depend only on characteristics of an exporting country.
Meanwhile, Arkolakis (2008) emphasizes that to serve a foreign market …rms may need labor services from both the source and the destination countries. Eaton et al. (2008) assume that market access costs depend only on importer characteristics. To account for the importer e¤ect on …xed costs, I assume that
That is, …xed costs of exporting depend on importer's development level as well. I then estimate the model applying the same estimation procedure as before. The set of the parameters I estimate is given by f 0 ; 1 ; 2 ; 3 ; 4 ; 5 ; f x ; ; g. Table 5 shows the estimates of the parameters (the …rst column reports the estimates obtained in the benchmark case). As it can be inferred, there is a negative correlation between the importer development level and the …xed costs of trade. The estimate of is 0:09 implying that it is relatively easier to export to more developed countries. However, the impact of the importer development level on the …xed costs is substantially lower than that Table 6 reports the trade elasticities and the percentage of zeros correctly predicted by the model. As it can be seen, the presence of the importer e¤ect does not signi…cantly change the trade elasticities and slightly improves the ability of the model to match zeros in the data.
The second column in
In his paper, Waugh (2009) 
Hence, if is greater than zero, then other things equal, more developed countries tend to have Correctly predicted zeros: 100% 35% 36% 27%
Observations: 100 100 100 100
lower variable costs of trade. I then estimate the parameters f 0 ; 1 ; 2 ; 3 ; 4 ; 5 ; f x ; g. Table 5 reports the parameter estimates. The estimate of is 0:22 meaning a strong negative correlation between variable costs of trade and country development levels, which is consistent with the …ndings in Waugh (2009) . The explanatory power slightly falls from 81% to 79%. However, this variation of the model considerably overestimates the impact of per capita income on trade volumes (see the fourth column in Table 6 ). The model predicts that controlling for the total income, doubling a country income per increases trade volumes of that country by 49% (compared to 19% in the data). Moreover, the percentage of correctly predicted zeros falls from 35% to 27% constituting larger mismatch between zeros predicted by the model and those in the data.
The third column in
Hence, while the relationship between variable costs of trade and development levels can also account for greater trade volumes of richer countries and zero trade ‡ows in the data, the model in this case performs much worse in matching the trade elasticities and zeros in the data.
Concluding Remarks
This paper contributes to a rapidly growing literature analyzing the role of …xed costs of trade in explaining trade volumes. I show that an association between …xed costs of trade and countries' development levels can qualitatively and quantitatively account for the relationship between per capita income and trade volumes observed in the data and explain a number of zeros in bilateral trade ‡ows.
There are several directions in which further research can be pursued. First, in the paper, the association between market access costs and development levels is estimated to match the data on aggregate trade volumes. It might seem desirable, however, to estimate this association using micro-level ("independent") data and then to examine how much of the relationship between per capita income and trade volumes is explained by the variation in …xed costs of trade. Secondly, it might be interesting to incorporate nonhomothetic preferences in the model. This would enable us to capture the e¤ects of both consumer preferences and market access costs on trade volumes in a general equilibrium framework. Finally, in the paper, I consider an environment where countries trade only in a di¤erentiated good. This framework is more applicable to the case of trade among rich countries. In particular, the setup of the model assumes away the possibility that trade ‡ows can be generated by di¤erences in factor endowments. To explain better trade between countries with di¤erent factor endowments, we can extend the model by incorporating the Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory (see for example Bernard et al. (2007) ). This would allow us to analyze both intra-industry and inter-industry trade and, thereby, to improve the …t of the model. I leave all the issues discussed above for future work.
Appendix A: Per Capita Income and Trade Volumes
In this section, I prove Proposition 1. The outline of the proof is as follows (see the details of the proof in the subsections). Suppose that country 2 trades more in the equilibrium. Since trade is balanced, country 2 imports more than country 1. That is,
As total incomes in the countries are the same (w 1 L 1 = w 2 L 2 ), (27) immediately implies that the price index in country 2 is higher than that in country 1: P 2 P 1 . Next, I show that if P 2 P 1 and the assumptions of the proposition hold, then country 1 exports more than country 2. This constitutes a contradiction, implying that country 1 trades strictly more than country 2 in the equilibrium. This stage of the proof has two steps.
Step 1: The free entry condition in (12) states that
Using the expression for ij ( ) in (6) and dividing ij ( ) by ij ( ij ), we obtain that
Taking into account that ij ( ij ) = f ij , the free entry condition for country i can be rewritten as follows:
Hence, condition (28) implies that for countries 1 and 2 (recall that countries 1 and 2 do not trade with each other):
Note that
is strictly less than or equal to
for all j = 1::N . This implies that at least for
Otherwise, (29) does not hold. This implies that 1j < 2j for some j. I show that in fact, 1j < 2j for all j > 2 (see details in the next subsection). That is, country 1 has a higher fraction of …rms in the total mass of entrants exporting to country j for any j > 2.
Step 2: Next, I show that country 1 has higher exports to domestic sales ratio than country 2. This means that country 1 exports more than country 2, as total incomes of the countries are the same. In the next subsection, I show that the result of the previous step and the fact that f 1j f 11 is strictly less than
As we assume that 1j = 2j for all j > 2, (30) implies that
Note that P 2 P 1 implies that
. This in turn means that
which is equivalent to
This …nishes the proof. In the next sections, I provide the details of the proof.
Proof of Step 1
At this stage of the proof, I show that 1j < 2j for all j > 2. Speci…cally, I …rst show that if 1j < 2j for some j > 2, then 1j < 2j for all j > 2. Then, I prove that the equality (29) implies that 1j < 2j at least for some j > 2. This …nishes the proof.
From the zero pro…t condition (7),
Substituting for f ij , the cuto¤s are given by
for j > 2 and i = 1; 2. (33) Given the expressions for the cuto¤s, it is straightforward to show that if 1j < 2j for some j > 2, then
As we assume that 1j = 2j for all j > 2, the last inequality implies that
From (33) and the fact that 1j = 2j , the last inequality results in that 1j < 2j for all j > 2.
Second, if
, then (remember that w 1 L 1 = w 2 L 2 , P 2 P 1 , and > 1)
Since H 0 ( ) < 0, we obtain that
This means that in order for (34) holds, 1j should be strictly less than 2j for some j > 2, implying that 1j < 2j for all j > 2 (see the considerations before).
Proof of Step 2
Here I show that in the equilibrium, R
To prove this result, I need the following technical lemma. Proof. The proof directly follows from di¤erentiating J(x). Namely, J 0 (x) 0 if and only if
is weakly increasing in x, which is assumed in the condition of the proposition.
Next, I use this lemma to show that (35) holds. To do so, we need to construct several additional variables. Speci…cally, we de…ne
Note that the proof of Step 1 implies that x 1 < x 2 in the equilibrium (as 1j < 2j for all j > 2).
In addition, for arbitrary j > 2 we de…ne A = 1j
that Assumption 2 says that 1j 11 for all j > 2. From (31) and (33), 1j 11 is equivalent to
The last inequality implies that A B.
Next, I apply Lemma 1 for x 1 , x 2 , A, and B de…ned above. As x 1 < x 2 , Lemma 1 implies
Note that from (31) and (33),
Moreover, from (33) and the assumption that 1j = 2j ,
Summarizing the …ndings above, we can rewrite (36) as follows:
Finally, since
(this is implied by P 2 P 1 and Z 1 > Z 2 ),
From (32),
That is,
The last inequality and (37) immediately imply that R
Since the choice of j was arbitrary, the last inequality holds for all j > 2.
Appendix B: Robustness Checks I consider one by one changes in f ; kg. That is, I change the value of one parameter …xing the others at the values set in the main body of the paper. In particular, I examine the following changes: falls from 3:8 to 3 and k rises from 3:4 to 4. Table 7 reports the parameter estimates. As it can be seen, the changes in f ; kg lead to the di¤erent estimates of the parameters. However, the explanatory power remains the same. and of 27% (k = 4), while the main model predicts a rise in trade volumes of 22%. and f x ). The explanatory power of the model does not change as well. Table 10 shows the trade elasticities and the number of zero trade ‡ows simulated by the model for the di¤erent restrictions. As it can be inferred from the table, a lower weight attached to the mismatch leads to much more zeros predicted by the model. If " = 0:25, then the model predicts 2607 zeros (compared to 1404 when " = 0:5). However, many of those zeros are "false" zeros. The number of correctly predicted zeros is 796. Therefore, lower " increases both the number of correctly predicted zeros and the mismatch. Similarly, higher " reduces both the mismatch and the number of correctly predicted zeros (see the fourth column of Table 10 ). Finally, the simulated trade elasticities are not much di¤erent from those obtained before.
Appendix D: Alternative Estimation Procedures
Another robustness check is to apply an alternative estimation procedure. The point is that nonlinear least squares (NLLS) attach greater weights to observations with higher values. Therefore, if high value observations have larger variance, then non-linear least squares may lead to inef- deviations (NLLD) and restricted non-linear least squares applied to logarithms rather than levels (NLLS(log)). Both of these procedures attach lower weights to high value observations compared to the procedure used in the paper.
In the case of non-linear least deviations we solve the following minimization problem: Notice that we cannot directly convert to logarithms, as there are zeros in the data. Therefore, I use another monotonic transformation. Speci…cally, instead of log(X o ij ) I consider log(X o ij + 1). This solves the problem of zeros. Moreover, if X o ij is equal to zero, then log X o ij + 1 is equal to zero as well. 
